



A B S T R A C T. In Privilege or Punish: CriminalJustice and the Challenge of Family Ties, Dan
Markel, Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib make an important contribution to the growing
literature on criminal law and families by documenting the ways that criminal law advantages
and burdens actors based on familial status and identifying the potential harms that are
unleashed when criminal law recognizes family status. This Feature seeks to complement that
contribution by situating the authors' observations within the context of two considerations
beyond Privilege or Punish's immediate focus: chronological trends and the practical realities that
can shape application of formal law. By distinguishing criminal law's traditions from
contemporary trends, the Feature identifies both a gradual de-emphasis of legally recognized
family forms and an increased willingness to enforce criminal law within families, regardless of
how they are comprised. It concludes by arguing that effective enforcement of criminal law
within families often requires the criminal justice system to yield to family relationships, not for
the purpose of promoting preferred family forms, but to serve the criminal law's familiar
retributive and utilitarian goals.
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INTRODUCTION
A man's tires are slashed. A woman is slapped. A child is sexually abused.
Because every penal code in the country criminalizes vandalism,' assault,
2
and child molestation, 3 criminal law reaches these harms.
But what if the owner of the slashed tires is the suspect's wife, making the
damaged tires joint property? What if the slapped woman was struck by her
husband and does not want to press charges? And what if the child was
molested by his mother and is incapable, either legally or psychologically, of
testifying against her?
In Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties,4 Dan
Markel, Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib ask whether criminal law should ever
recognize family relationships, and, if so, when and how? As a descriptive
summary, the book exhaustively documents the diverse ways that criminal law
both advantages and burdens actors based on familial status. The criminal law
creates "family ties benefits" when it confers testimonial privileges upon
spouses, s exempts family members from prosecution for harboring fugitives, 6
permits parents to use corporal punishment against their children,7 mitigates
murder to manslaughter when provoked by adultery,8 shows lenience toward
1. The common law punished intentional damage to the property of another as the
misdemeanor of malicious mischief 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 1, at 122-24 (2000).
The Model Penal Code refers to the offense as "Criminal Mischief." MODEL PENAL CODE
5 220.3 (1980).
2. At common law, an act of physical violence was considered a battery, and conduct creating
the apprehension of violence was an assault. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAw § 16.1 (2d ed. 2003) (distinguishing assault from battery). Many modern
penal codes, however, dispense with the term "battery" and generally define the infliction of
physical injury as some form of assault, and offensive physical touching that does not inflict
injury as "harassment." See id. at 551 n.2; MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (1980) (defining an
offensive touching as harassment).
3. See LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 17.4(c) (tracing the evolution from an early English statute
prohibiting carnal knowledge with a child under ten years of age to contemporary state
statutes criminalizing sexual activity with a broader range of minors).
4. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009).
s. Id. at 3-5.
6. Id. at 6-8.
7. Id. at 9-1o.




sex offenders who victimize family members,9 and favors family members in
pretrial release,"0 sentencing," and incarceration decisions. 2 Conversely, the
criminal law creates "family ties burdens" when it imposes duties to rescue
family members,'3 holds parents responsible for their children's crimes,
14
prosecutes incest, bigamy, and adultery,"5 and criminalizes the nonpayment of
child and parental support. 6
As a normative project, the book identifies the potential harms that are
unleashed when criminal law recognizes family status: the perpetuation of
patriarchal norms, 7  discrimination against nontraditional families, 8
interference with crime control and an efficient criminal justice system,' 9
infringement upon recognition-worthy liberties,20 and the unnecessary levying
of criminal sanctions where other measures might suffice.' Because of these
implications, the authors counsel cautiousness against family ties benefits and
burdens.2 The authors instead favor a facially neutral criminal law-one in
9. According to the authors, the criminal law privileges family status directly by making it
harder to convict men who commit sexual offenses against their wives than those who
victimize nonspouses. Id. at ii. It does so indirectly when the state prosecutes intrafamily
sexual offenses as incest rather than under general sex abuse statutes that would trigger sex
offender registration requirements. Id.
lo. Id. at 12.
ii. Id. at 12-16.
12. Id. at 16-19.
13. Id. at 63-65.
14. Id. at 66-69.
iS. Id. at 69-72.
Id. at 72-73.
E.g., id. at 26-27, 84.
E.g., id. at 29-31, 83-84.
E.g., id. at 27-29, 32.
E.g., id. at 96.
E.g., id.
At the same time, Privilege or Punish acknowledges the work of scholars who highlight the
importance of families to the development of good citizens. See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN,
THE PLACE OF FAMIIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALrrY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006);
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond
Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997). The authors do not argue that criminal law can
never promote families or particular forms. Instead, they create a presumption against
criminal laws that confer family ties benefits and burdens in light of their normative
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which families and family members are advantaged or burdened by generally
applicable criminal statutes, without regard to family status. 3
By describing the ways that criminal law privileges and punishes actors
based on family status, and by identifying the potential harms of the resulting
benefits and burdens, Privilege or Punish unquestionably makes a significant
contribution to a growing literature at the nexus of criminal and family law.
This Feature seeks to complement that contribution by situating the authors'
observations within the context of two considerations beyond Privilege or
Punish's immediate focus of family ties benefits and burdens: chronological
trends and the practical realities that can shape application of formal law. First,
using the book's thorough cataloguing of criminal law's reactions to family
status, this Feature seeks to distinguish between American criminal law's
traditions and its more contemporary developments. Because Privilege or Punish
is concerned with the criminal law's reliance on formal family status,
antiquated and rarely enforced statutes against adultery and the dwindling
number of manslaughter statutes that codify spousal infidelity as automatic
grounds for provocation are collected alongside more recent inventions such as
sex offender registries and the criminalization of the failure to pay child
support.' Similarly, the book rightly condemns the criminal justice system's
traditionally light hand toward violence in the family, but the contemporary
burgeoning of law enforcement directed against domestic violence is largely
beyond its scope."5 By comparing the old against the new, this Feature credits
an important shift in criminal law's treatment of families -from previously
viewing families as private as long as they conformed to prevailing notions of
family, to now enforcing its proscriptions even when it must adjust to do so
within the home.
This Feature also explores a second important development in the criminal
law's treatment of families: the recognition of the interplay between criminal
law and procedure. Recent criminal law scholarship teaches us that real-world
23. The authors instead propose a registry system through which individuals, whether related
under family law or not, could opt into a system of voluntary caregiving obligations,
punishable by criminal law if violated. This Feature does not address that aspect of Privilege
or Punish's proposal. For thoughtful responses to the authors' suggested reform, see
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Do Families Need Special Rules of Criminal Law?: A Reply to Professors
Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1425 (2008); and Michael M. O'Hear, Yes to
Nondiscrimination, No to New Forms of Criminal Liability: A Reply to Professors Collins, Leib,
and Markel, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1437 (2008).
24. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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processes shape the practical effects of formal doctrine.26 However, because it is
concerned with distinctions based on formal family status, Privilege or Punish
largely adheres to the four corners of formal statutory law, forestalling any
discussion of what it deems to be the law "on the streets."27 Perhaps because of
that self-imposed limitation, the authors do not explore one reason why
criminal law must sometimes adjust to families-not to privilege or punish
family for family's sake, but instead to reach a domestic sphere that the law
traditionally treated as private and impenetrable.
This Feature recasts Privilege or Punish's thorough cataloguing of the many
collisions between formal criminal law and families through the lenses of time
and procedural realities. Looking at changes to the criminal law's approach to
families over time, Part I traces an evolution in criminal law's treatment of
family boundaries and intrafamily privacy. Because criminal law was
traditionally reluctant to intervene within families out of concern for
intrafamily privacy, traditional criminal law also promoted and regulated the
boundaries that divided properly constituted (and presumptively private)
families from other relationships that could be policed.s Over time, however,
the lines that separate formal families from other relationships have lost their
traditional importance as criminal law has become more willing to enforce its
proscriptions within families, despite traditional concerns about privacy. Many
of the family ties benefits and burdens documented in Privilege or Punish were
intended to regulate family boundaries and protect intrafamily privacy. As
criminal law has learned to cross family boundaries, the benefits and burdens
that served to regulate and protect those boundaries have begun to fall from
favor.
Turning to the real-world implications of applying criminal law to families,
Part II draws in part on my experience prosecuting cases involving families29
and argues that criminal law has learned not only to reach within families, but
also to react to the realities within them. The application of formal criminal law
to families is often complicated by the past, present, and future relationships
between affected family members. Because of the procedural difficulties of
applying formal law to families, the criminal justice system must sometimes
26. See infra note 70.
27. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 152 (noting in a brief discussion of domestic violence reforms
that "the law 'on the streets' falls a bit outside the purview of our book" because the book
focuses on "facial benefits").
28. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
29. Prior to entering academia, I served as a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon,
where I prosecuted domestic violence, child support, and parental responsibility cases,
among other offenses.
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yield to such relationships, not for the purpose of facilitating or preserving
families per se, but to achieve the criminal law's usual objectives of retribution
and deterrence within them.
I. PAST VERSUS PRESENT
Privilege or Punish assumes that when criminal law yields to family status, it
usually does so not to serve its accepted functions of retribution and
deterrence, but instead with the separate purpose of facilitating certain family
structures. For example, the authors conclude that "the criminal justice system,
with a few exceptions, is not generally an appropriate place to foster a
particular vision of family life."3 Similarly, they summarize their wariness of
the role that family status plays in criminal law by stating that the criminal
justice system "should only rarely and cautiously serve as a vehicle for directly
promoting the institution and goods of family life."31 This assumption affects
both the book's descriptive and its prescriptive content, as the authors depict a
criminal law landscape crowded with family ties benefits and burdens and then
conclude that most of them serve no legitimate retributive or utilitarian
purpose.
The authors' depiction of criminal law's objectives regarding families is
especially reflective of criminal law's traditional proscriptions. The feminist
critique of criminal law (as with other areas of the law) is that it historically
treated families, marriages, and domestic life as "private," insulated from state
interference. 32 As Privilege or Punish correctly notes, criminal law shielded the
30. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 149.
31. Id. at 154.
32. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193-94
(1989) (noting how traditional legal conceptions of privacy have shielded marital rape and
other forms of violence against women); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 338-48 (2003) (summarizing the law's historical ambivalence
toward intervening in family life); Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations:
Can Law Stop the Violence?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 851, 852 (2000) ("[T]he private sphere
shielding violence in the home lay beyond the reach of the law .... ."); Jane C. Murphy,
Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family
Law, 60 U. PiTr. L. REv. 111, 1165 (1999) ("One of the most deeply embedded principles in
American family law is the principle of family autonomy, which limits the state's
intervention in the affairs of the intact family."); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing
the "legal tradition of noninterference in the family"); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 974 (1991) (maintaining that protection of family privacy
should not prevent state efforts to reduce domestic violence); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of
Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 1o5 YALE L.J. 2117, 2154-61 (1996) (discussing
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privacy of families by, for example, conferring testimonial privileges between
spouses33 and, more troublingly, enabling violence toward wives and children,
both through formal law and institutionalized acquiescence. 4
In light of criminal law's historical prioritization of intrafamily privacy, it is
perhaps unsurprising that criminal law traditionally regulated the boundaries
that determined family forms and thereby separated private sanctuaries" from
public concern. Although criminal law was reluctant to intervene in the private
affairs of properly constituted marriages, it did not hesitate to punish those
who violated or challenged the normative ideals of family composition. From
this perspective, as Melissa Murray has noted, prohibitions against incest,
adultery, sodomy, prostitution, and birth control can all be seen as criminal
law's regulation of marriage as a heterosexual and procreative institution., 6 So
too could we cast the common law's provocation doctrine, which mitigated
murder to manslaughter when directed against adulterous wives or interposing
paramours.37 In Privilege or Punish terms, criminal law's family ties benefits and
burdens worked hand in hand to define, protect, reinforce, and police the
contours of properly constituted families and the lines of intimacy that
distinguished between the public and the private.
But contemporary reforms challenge the traditional narrative about
criminal law's treatment of family and family status. Seven years after the
Supreme Court recognized a right to contraception within marriages,38 it
extended its reasoning to unmarried couples.39 States stopped enforcing
how courts have used the rhetoric of "affective privacy" to privilege violence by upper- and
middle-class men).
33. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-6.
34. See id. at 9-11, 26-27.
35. Logan, supra note 32, at 322, 338-48 (labeling the family as a "sanctuary" from the
enforcement of criminal law).
36. See Melissa Murray, The Private Life of Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS
692, 692 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009)
("[C]riminal law has worked in tandem with family law to police the normative contours of
marriage and intimate life."); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law,
and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1256, 1270 (2009)
("Historically, criminal law and family law have worked in tandem to produce a binary view
of intimate life that categorizes intimate acts and choices as either legitimate marital behavior
or illegitimate criminal behavior.").
37. See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904) ("[T]here can be no difference in the
degree of the crime, whether the betrayed husband slays the faithless wife or her guilty
paramour.").
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sodomy laws long before the Court struck them down in Lawrence v. Texas.4 °
As the authors note, a majority of states no longer criminalize adultery, and
those.that do typically leave the prohibition unenforced.4' Although states do
criminalize bigamy,42 the few recent polygamy-based prosecutions also
involved marriage-neutral charges such as child sexual abuse or welfare fraud,
suggesting that prosecutors target polygamists not for plural marriage but for
the harms associated with them.43 The trend toward mitigating murder to
40. 539 U.S. 558, 572-74 (2003) (summarizing a pattern of nonenforcement of state sodomy
laws). Even when the Supreme Court initially upheld the criminalization of sodomy in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the trend against such laws was under way. The
majority of states had already repealed their sodomy statutes, and even the state of Georgia,
although defending the constitutionality of its prohibition in Bowers, conceded it was unable
to locate a record of any prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under the statute for
several decades. Id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). As Justice Powell wrote in his
concurrence, "It]he history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of
laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct." Id. By the time the Court
overturned Bowers in Lawrence, only thirteen states criminalized sodomy, and prosecutions
by those states were rare. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
41. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 71. The authors maintain that "adultery laws are a clear and
conventional family ties burden" because they are enforced within the military and have
collateral consequences in custody, adoption, and employment matters. Id. at 71-72.
However, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,"
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506 (1986) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the civil consequences ofadultery may stem
more from the continued perception that adultery is immoral than the formal
criminalization of it.
42. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 290 n.51 (2004) (citing bigamy statutes).
43. John Dougherty, Polygamist Is Indicted in Assault of a Child, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A14
(reporting that of six men involved in a polygamy scandal, including previously convicted
rapist and sect leader Warren Jeffs, four had been charged with sexually assaulting minors
and another one had been charged with failure to report child abuse, while only one was
actually charged with bigamy); John Dougherty & Kirk Johnson, Sect Leader Is Convicted As
an Accomplice to Rape, N.Y. TtMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A18 (reporting that polygamist sect
leader Warren Jeffs was convicted as an accomplice to rape of a fourteen-year-old church
member); Dan Frosch, Texas Report Says 12 Girls at Sect Ranch Were Married, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2008, at A17 (reporting that charges against men from a sect at the Yearning for
Zion Ranch in Texas included both sexual assault of a minor and bigamy); Michael
Janofsky, Trial Opens in Rare Case of a Utahan Charged With Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, May i5,
2001, at A12 (reporting that prosecutors who had "largely ignored the state's polygamists
except in cases of child abuse and welfare fraud" were prosecuting Tom Green for child
rape, bigamy, and criminal nonsupport); Ben Winslow, Pro-Polygamy Group Strives to
Educate: Principle Voices Reaches Outside, Inside Its Community, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), July 26, 2008, at B7 (reporting the Utah Attorney General's policy that "it
won't prosecute bigamy per se, but instead focuses its resources on going after child abuse,
sex crimes, domestic violence, and welfare fraud within polygamous communities").
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manslaughter abolishes adultery as a privileged source of emotion and entrusts
juries to determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position
would have been provoked into a heat of passion.' And although wives could
not be prosecuted for harboring husbands at common law, currently federal
law, the Model Penal Code, and a strong majority of states contain no
family-based exceptions to harboring prohibitions.4" In short, as even civil
restrictions on marriage change faster than many of us ever imagined,46 the
criminal law no longer concerns itself with the policing of family boundaries.
As a consequence, many of the family ties benefits and burdens set forth in
Privilege or Punish are repealed, unenforced, and/or increasingly disfavored.
At the same time, contemporary criminal law is more willing to intervene
within family boundaries to act upon conduct that was previously sanctioned as
private. Privilege or Punish maintains that "the criminal law system still exhibits
a great reluctance to interfere in the private life of the family,"47 but a separate
story can be found in just how much the criminal law's approach to family
privacy has changed. For example, criminal statutes mandating the payment of
child support"8 and holding parents liable for the crimes of their children,
49
both generally disfavored by the authors, evidence a willingness to intervene
within families, even at the expense of intrafamily privacy. Similarly, although
Privilege or Punish highlights the remaining vestiges of the common law's
marital rape exception, 0 an alternative narrative could emphasize the marked
44. See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 471, 500 (2008) ("Today,
provocation is considered legally adequate if the reasonable person in the defendant's shoes
would have been provoked into a heat of passion."). The Model Penal Code is even more
flexible, instructing jurors that the reasonableness of a defendant's explanation or excuse
"shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1980).
4S. Privilege or Punish emphasizes the exemptions for family members who harbor fugitives,
depicting current exceptions as "significantly broader" than the common law exemption for
wives because they extend to other family members. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 7. The
authors also emphasize that fourteen states "remarkably" exempt family members from
harboring even those fugitives who committed serious felonies and another four reduce
liability based on family status. Id. However, the authors also note that the majority of state
penal codes, as well as federal law and the Model Penal Code, contain no family-based
exceptions. Id. at 162-63 nn.46-48, 52 and accompanying text.
46. Although the state of same-sex marriage is fluid, at one time six states permitted same-sex
couples to marry. Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 4, 2009, at Al9.
47. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 27.
48. Id. at 140-44.
4g- Id. at 112-18.
50. Id. at 11, 27, 177 n.39.
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trend toward abolishment of spousal immunity for rape."1 The criminal law
retains parental rights to reasonable discipline, 2 but child abuse prosecutions
have increased despite the continuation of corporal punishment doctrine. 3
Federal law links the receipt of federal funds to state compliance with child
abuse reporting and investigation requirements.14 State child protective service
agencies are more likely to refer cases of neglect and abuse to law enforcement
for a criminal investigation,s" and prosecutors are more likely to pursue
charges. s6 Once charges are filed, prosecutors are better at making their cases.
The National District Attorneys Association established the National Center
for Prosecution of Child Abuse in 1985 to provide training and technical
assistance to prosecutors across the country.' Police and prosecutors receive
51. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1,
7 ("'[M]arital rape' is no longer considered an oxymoron."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and
Consent: A Legal Histoty of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (noting that
"[v]irtually every state legislature has revisited the marital rape exemption over the last
twenty-five years," but that "[i] majority of states still retain some form of the common law
regime"); Karen Morao, Domestic Violence and the State, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 787, 791
(20o6) (reporting that although some states confer marriage-based defenses in rape cases,
"all states have broken from historical tradition and currently recognize spousal rape as a
crime") (footnotes omitted).
52. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 9-10, 45-46.
53. See David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse,
FUTURE OF CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 31, 34 (explaining the difficulty of tracking crime
statistics measuring crimes against child victims but reporting that sexual abuse and child
mistreatment cases as a whole increased in the 198os and early 199os); Mark Hardin, Legal
Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV.
493, 496-97 (1988) (noting increase in both child abuse reports and substantiated claims);
John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 46
BAYLORL. REv. 873, 88o (1994) (reporting a substantial increase in child abuse prosecutions
in the 198os); Eric C. Shedlosky, Protecting Children from the Harmful Behavior of Adults, 98
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 313-14 (2007) (linking an increase in the number of child
abuse prosecutions to the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act and a number of
highly publicized child abuse cases).
54. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-51o6 (2006)).
ss. See Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys in Dependency Proceedings in Juvenile Court: Defining
and Assessing a Critical Role in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1 J. CENTER CHILD. & CTS. 73,
85-86 (1999) (describing the coordination of civil and criminal child abuse proceedings).
56. Victor I. Vieth, The Mutilation of a Child's Spirit: A Calfor a New Approach to Termination of
Parental Rights in Cases of Child Abuse, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 727, 773 (1994) (citing data
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics demonstrating that ninety percent of offenders arrested
for crimes against children are prosecuted).
57. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,




specialized training and work with multidisciplinary teams to interview child
witnesses."s Legislatures and courts have adopted procedures intended to
protect minors who testify against their abusers. s9 Moreover, despite a parent's
right to use corporal punishment, jurors may be less likely to acquit in light of
heightened public awareness about child abuse.6°
The erosion of the traditional border between criminal law and family
privacy is perhaps best evidenced by the last thirty years of domestic violence
reforms.61 Indeed, thanks to changes in both formal law and police and
58. Scahill, supra note 55, at 85-86 (discussing multidisciplinary teams that coordinate civil and
criminal child abuse proceedings); Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims
of Child Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT.
REv. 167, 174-75 (2009) (discussing interview training provided by the American
Prosecutors Research Institute); see also Myers, supra note 53, at 899 n.126 (noting
improvements in law enforcement training on child abuse and interviewing techniques).
59. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 6o9-11 (1982) (striking down a
mandatory rule requiring closure of the courtroom from the press during a minor victim's
testimony in sexual abuse trials, but noting that trial courts have discretion to weigh the
interests of the victim against First Amendment interests on a case-by-case basis); John E.B.
Myers, A Decade of International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and
Litigation: Steps Toward a Child Witness Code, 28 PAc. L.J. 169, 170 (1996) (noting a trend
toward the relaxation of the usual evidentiary and procedural rules of the adversary process
to facilitate the testimony of minor victims); Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse
Litigation in a "Testimonial" World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation,
82 IND. L.J. 1009 (2007) (discussing the admissibility of child hearsay and the competency
of child witnesses in light of the Supreme Court's recent Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence).
60. See Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303, 1340-41 (2000)
(noting the success of national organizations in heightening public awareness of cases
involving child abuse). Although spanking by parents remains prevalent, see Kandice K.
Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense-Reasonable and
Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 428-29, there is a trend toward the
opposition of corporal punishment. The majority of states ban corporal punishment in
schools, and the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the National
Education Association, and other noteworthy professional organizations oppose all forms of
corporal punishment. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REv.
575, 593-94 (2003). In states that define the parental discipline defense in terms of the
"reasonableness" of the punishment inflicted, see id. at 636-37, juror attitudes toward
corporal punishment will shape the scope of the defense. See generally CYNTHIA LEE,
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM
(2003) (noting the ways that social norms affect juror applications of criminal defenses
requiring reasonableness).
61. See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 552 (2007) (surveying the criminal justice
system's advancements in the treatment of domestic violence as a crime); Cheryl Hanna,
The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1505, 1539 (1998) ("Legal reforms of the last twenty years mark a shift in the characterization
1221
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prosecutorial policies, the criminal justice system sometimes responds more
seriously to intrafamily violence than other forms of assault. For example,
some state statutes authorize, or even mandate, warrantless custodial arrests
for domestic violence misdemeanors that would lead only to a citation if
committed against a stranger.6 Police and prosecutors devote extra resources
to domestic violence intervention through specialized training programs and
niche investigative and trial units intended to increase the likelihood of
prosecution in domestic violence cases.6s Some state legislatures have
authorized longer sentences for violence committed against intimates
compared to other victims.
64
Moreover, criminal law's intervention into intimate and family
relationships can be highly intrusive and unwanted. Under no-drop policies,
prosecutors pursue criminal charges in domestic violence cases regardless of
of domestic violence from a private to a public problem."). For an overview of legal reforms
targeting the problem of domestic violence, see generally EvE S. BUZAWA & CARL G.
BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d ed. 2003); and
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
6z. Many states have codified the common law rule that police can arrest misdemeanants
without a warrant only if the misdemeanor is committed in a police officer's presence. See
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419 (1976). Nevertheless, every state in the country
permits police to make warrantless arrests in all domestic violence cases, despite limitations
on warrantless arrests in other misdemeanor cases. Cheryl Hanna, No Right To Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 1o9 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1859
(1996). Other states go further and mandate, rather than merely authorize, arrest whenever
probable cause exists in a domestic violence case. See Vito Nicholas Ciraco, Note, Fighting
Domestic Violence with Mandatory Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New Jersey, 22
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 169, 172-75 (2001); Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic
Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 643, 677 (1997).
63. See Proclamation No. 7601, 3 C.F.R. 142 (2002) (listing specialized domestic violence
prosecution units among important reforms); BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 61, at 177-90
(discussing prosecutorial advancements in domestic violence cases); LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 25-54 (1992)
(discussing contemporary police responses to domestic violence).
64. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A-6-1 3 2 (LexisNexis 2009) (defining domestic violence in the
third degree as a Class A misdemeanor even when committed through harassment, an
offense that would otherwise constitute only a Class C misdemeanor under
section 13A-11-8); GA. CODE ANN. § 16- 5-2o(d) (2009) (providing that simple assault
committed against a past or present spouse, a cohabitant, or other protected party "shall be
punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature"). Other states impose
lengthier sentences for domestic violence recidivists than other repeat offenders. See, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(3) (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.063(2) (West 1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. S 45-5-206(3) (2009); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.485(1) (LexisNexis 2009);




the victims' preferences and even over virulent objection.6 s As Jeannie Suk has
noted, prosecution in even misdemeanor domestic violence cases can result not
only in the fines and incarceration that are traditional punishments in criminal
cases, but also in the involuntary imposition of no-contact orders that force
separation between offender and victim-even husband and wife-over the
parties' expressed wishes.66 Importantly, and contrary to the thesis of Privilege
or Punish regarding formal family ties benefits and burdens, these interactions
between criminal law and families are not for the purpose of "promoting the
institution and goods of family life," but rather for the purpose of pursuing the
usual deterrence and retributive aims of criminal law, even within families.
Because Privilege or Punish focuses on formal divisions based on family
status, not the enforcement of general criminal law within families, it spends
few pages outside the sentencing and corrections context discussing today's
most common interactions between the criminal justice system and families. As
a descriptive matter, however, the increased enforcement of criminal law
within families runs counter to the book's depiction of a world dominated by
benefits to defendants who victimize family members. Moreover, as a
normative matter, if one believes that criminal law should seek deterrence and
retribution even within families (as the authors surely do), to advocate only for
the neutral enforcement of general criminal laws is too simple. The criminal
justice system, after all, traditionally conferred privacy upon recognized
families. It is no surprise, then, that the pursuit of criminal law objectives
within families can present novel problems for police, prosecutors, and courts.
As criminal law has learned to reach within families, it has also learned to react
to their uniqueness. Many of these reactions are found not in the formal law on
which Privilege or Punish focuses, but at the intersection between formal
doctrine and real world practice.
II. FORMAL DOCTRINE VERSUS PRAGMATIC EFFECTS
Privilege or Punish concerns itself almost entirely with the four corners of
formal criminal law. While noting that the criminal justice system confers
6S. SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 284-88; Hanna, supra note 61; Emily J. Sack, Battered Women
and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 1657,
1672-74.
66. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006); see also LINDA G. MILLS,
INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 33 (2003) (arguing that
the pursuit of criminal charges over the victims' wishes is "mostly symbolic" and largely
ineffective).
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informal benefits and burdens upon family,6" the authors maintain that
scholars and policymakers must first have a framework for analyzing family
ties benefits and burdens before applying that framework beyond formal law.68
To "develop that framework in the first instance," they opt to "focus on facial
benefits and burdens.,,6 9 By adopting this approach, they assume that a proper
framework for analyzing benefits and burdens can be crafted by looking solely
at formal law. However, a growing body of literature demonstrates the
importance of examining formal doctrine in the context of the procedural
realities that shape its application.7 0 Moreover, even if one accepts the authors'
framework, created through the lens of formal law, the application of that
framework should take real world processes into account. Instead, Privilege or
Punish focuses only on formal law, without tackling the practical difficulties of
applying formal law within families. Indeed, the authors appear to recognize
the importance of real-world processes when they note that formal law is often
dominated by "life on the streets." 71 In light of this concession, their decision
nevertheless to focus almost exclusively on formal law in isolation is puzzling.
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67. To illustrate informal benefits, the authors note that a police officer might decide not to
arrest a suspect for assaulting a family member, or that a juror might vote to acquit a
husband of raping his wife because the juror believes, despite the law, that a man is entitled
to demand sex from his wife. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at xv.
6s. Id.
69. Id.
7o. E.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, lno YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence
for failing to consider its effects in a world of guilty pleas); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v.
United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (997)
(examining the ways that formal evidentiary rules might affect prosecutorial discretion);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing the intersection of substantive criminal law, procedure,
and funding realities); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and
Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REv.
1935 (2006) (providing an empirical look at the ways in which formal criminal codes affect
charging and plea bargaining). See generally Darryl K. Brown, Watching Legislatures for
Apprendi's Effects on Plea Bargaining, 5 CAL. CRiM. L. R.Ev. 1, 1 14 (2002) (noting the
"important modem trend in the scholarship of criminal law (and other areas) to look at how
real-world dynamics are likely to shape the practical effect of formal rules").
71. MARKEL Er AL., supra note 4, at 26 (noting that although "wife beating" was eventually
criminalized, in "life on the streets ... the act of wife beating was often viewed as a
nonevent from the eyes of the state").
72. Moreover, because general criminal law was often unconcerned with intrafamily conduct,
existing substantive criminal law may not capture the harms unique to intrafamily offenses.
For example, Deborah Tuerkheimer and I have called for the criminalization of domestic
violence separate from the general statutes typically used to prosecute it. See Burke, supra
119:1210 2010
WHEN FAMILY MATTERS
Examining formal law as it is applied is especially important in cases
involving families. Privilege or Punish is wary of family-based criminal law in
part because "[t]he American family is a far more complex entity today than
our current system of benefits and burdens acknowledges. ' 73 But the authors
concern themselves primarily with one dimension of this complexity, the
evolving definition of "family." Families, however, no matter how they are
defined, are also complex in their interpersonal, economic, and emotional
dynamics. It is precisely because of these complexities that the criminal law
cannot always remain "general." Instead, it must acknowledge and yield to the
unique considerations that arise when criminal law reaches into the home.
To the extent that contemporary criminal law continues to make family-
based distinctions,74 many of these distinctions can be seen as pragmatic
mechanisms through which criminal law must operate given the complexities
of prosecuting offenses within families. For example, in Privilege or Punish, the
authors argue that some state statutes give preferential treatment to family
members by excluding incest from the registration and notification
requirements triggered by other sexual offenses. 7 They also indicate that they
are troubled when offenders are permitted to plead guilty to incest instead of
generally applicable sexual abuse statutes.
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However, these criticisms do not reflect the real-world difficulties of
prosecuting child sex offenses, particularly those committed by family
members. Children often delay reports of abuse because they fear the breakup
of their family, the defendant's incarceration, or the anger or skepticism of
other family members.7 They can be reluctant to testify against fathers and
guilt-inflicted when they do.78 Even if a case does go to trial, proving the truth
note 61; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call To
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959 (2004). This Feature does
not address the issue of whether general criminal law is sufficient to target intrafamily
crimes, but the question is another that Privilege or Punish largely overlooks.
73. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 154.
74. Part I, supra, established that many of criminal law's family ties benefits and burdens have
been repealed or are unenforced or disfavored.
75. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
76. Id. at 69.
77. See NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 76, 429 (3 d ed. 2004) (discussing the
delayed reporting ofintrafamily sexual abuse cases).
78. Mark K. Cavins & Lori Smith, Keeping Kids on Your Side: An Innovative Approach to Child Sex
Abuse Victims, PROSECuToR, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 2o, 2o-21 (reporting results of an empirical
study of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office and concluding that "love, trust, power
or authority increases a child's potential for recantation and/or reluctance"); Is Testifying
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of a victimized child's testimony beyond a reasonable doubt can be difficult,
especially in intrafamily cases. More so than other offenders, fathers can
explain away their presence in bedrooms and bathrooms. They can depict their
children's mothers as brainwashing witness tamperers looking for revenge or
an upper hand in child support and custody matters, and their children as
well-intentioned but manipulated fabricators.79 What sounds like sexual
contact in a police report is reframed at trial as an innocent misunderstanding,
blown out of proportion by police and prosecutors. As a consequence, the
benefits of avoiding trial in intrafamily sexual abuse cases are considerable. o
Viewed in the context of plea bargaining realities, the criminal law's
differential treatment of incest compared to other sex offenses can be seen not
as a direct preference for family status, as Privilege or Punish largely assumes,
but instead as a reaction to the realities of enforcing general criminal law
prohibitions within families. Indeed, the vast majority of reported incest cases
involve not the consensual adult relationships to which Privilege or Punish
devotes so much tolerant attention, ' but sexual abuse by fathers of children
who cannot give legal consent.s2 Permitting defendants in such cases to plead
Harmful for Sex Abuse Victims?, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 6, 6-7 (summarizing
"mixed conclusions" of three separate studies but reporting that all researchers agreed that
child sex abuse victims "registered high rates of stress and anxiety" before testifying, and
that children who testified multiple times "tended not to improve as much as children who
testified only once or not at all"); Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, I J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153 (1992) (reporting that children are
reluctant to testify in intrafamily sex abuse cases); cf NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF
CHILD ABUSE, supra note 77, at 218 (noting that "[d]iscomfort" from trial is "unavoidable,"
but that the child witness's distress can be mitigated and "must be weighed against the
threat posed by the defendant").
79. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 77, at 430-33 (laying out common
defense arguments in child abuse cases, including a child's history of bad behavior,
allegations of coaching by another parent involved in custody and divorce battles with the
defendant, and claims that the child is lying to retaliate against strict parenting); Myers,
supra note 53, at 939-40 n.295 ("It is unfortunately true that in a small percentage of
contested child custody disputes unscrupulous parents fabricate allegations of sexual abuse
and persuade or coach children to make false allegations.").
8o. See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 98 (1993)
(reporting in an empirical study of child sexual abuse cases that diversion is used to keep
families intact when the defendant provides financial and emotional support); NAT'L CTR.
FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 77, at 212-13 (discussing the benefits of early
guilty pleas).
81. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 69-70, 118-27. Even with regard to incest between adults,
one might reasonably question whether these relationships are truly consensual, an issue
that is well beyond the focus of this Feature.
82. Christine A. Courtois & Judith E. Sprei, Retrospective Incest Therapy for Women, in




guilty to incest and thereby avoid the stigma of a rape or sexual abuse
conviction and what would otherwise be mandatory sex offender registration is
sometimes the best way to secure a conviction and incarceration while sparing
the victim from testifying and avoiding the risk of acquittal. From a utilitarian
perspective, a negotiated plea to incest is preferable to an acquittal because it
permits incapacitation of the offender and provides deterrence.8 ' Even a
retributivist would favor an incest conviction over acquittal because it permits
the imposition of deserved punishment.84 However, because Privilege or Punish
limits its focus to formal law, it overlooks the important utilitarian and
retributive functions served by current plea bargaining and sex offense
registration approaches for incest cases involving minor victims.
Privilege or Punish's brief discussion of domestic violence prosecutions
similarly underestimates the impact of plea negotiations on the enforcement of
general criminal law within families. Although the authors largely omit any
discussion of contemporary law enforcement directed against domestic
violence, they indicate that they would disfavor any approach that treated
domestic violence offenders "better" than offenders who committed
comparable crimes against strangers or acquaintances."s As an example, they
compare diversion against traditional prosecution.86 This quantification of
punishment overlooks the picture on the ground. As an initial matter, it is
unclear that diversion should be characterized as a more favorable result for
("Until recently, a widely held belief was that peer incest (i.e., between siblings and between
cousins) was the most frequent .... Recent research .... suggests that intergenerational
contact, especially father-daughter and stepfather-daughter, is the most prevalent . . .")
(citation omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 61 (observing that "most" incest cases
"involve minors unable to give legal consent").
83. For presentations of a utilitarian view of punishment, see JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 322-38 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); John Smart Mill,
Utilitarianism, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 895, 899-916 (Edwin
A. Burtt ed., 1939); and Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian
Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 319-34 (1984).
84. For presentations of a retributivist view of punishment, see generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 238-45 (1984); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1997); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of
Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1632-33 (1992); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms
Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1992); H.J.
McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249 (1965); and Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1985).
85. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 152.
86. Id. at 151.
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offenders than a traditional case disposition. Recognizing that traditional
prosecutions can lead to repeated formal dispositions without addressing an
offender's root problems, jurisdictions have increasingly turned to problem-
solving courts.8 7 Domestic violence diversion programs reflect this trend.8 In
exchange for dismissal of formal charges, these programs often require
prolonged and intensive counseling aimed specifically at the underlying causes
of intimate violence.8 ' From a utilitarian perspective, meaningful diversion
programs are arguably more effective than the pro forma convictions, fines,
and brief periods of incarceration that are typical in misdemeanor assault cases.
Because many defendants will be returning to relationships with their victims,
sentencing options that involve ongoing monitoring of the defendant and seek
to alter the defendant's propensity for violence against the victim could be
more likely to prevent recidivism than a typical misdemeanor assault
sentence.9" However, because Privilege or Punish focuses almost entirely on
87. See generally GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE (2005) (describing the growing trend toward problem-solving courts);
Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts,
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897 (2003) (examining Red Hook, New York's community courts);
Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955 (2003);
Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH.
U.J.L. &POL'Y 63, 83-92 (2002).
88. Rekha Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy: Problem-Solving Courts and the Deliberative Democratic
State, 33 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 853 (2008) (situating a case study of Salt Lake City's domestic
violence courts within an examination of problem-solving courts generally).
89. See Robert T. Jarvis, A Proposal for a Model Domestic Violence Protocol, 47 LOY. L. REV. 513, 529
(2001) (describing a Texas jurisdiction that offers one year of deferred probation requiring
twenty-six weeks of family violence counseling for first-time domestic violence offenses);
Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice": The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the
Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2006)
(describing Washington, D.C. Domestic Violence Court, where defendants who have no
substantial criminal histories and who have not inflicted significant injuries receive deferred
sentencing requiring nine months of domestic violence counseling); Mirchandani, supra
note 88, at 872 (noting that a typical participant in Salt Lake City's diversion program
underwent twenty-six counseling sessions over six months); see also Deborah M. Weissman,
Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local,"
42 B.C. L. REV. lo8i, 1128-29 (2001) (questioning the efficacy of specialized domestic
violence courts).
go. See JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LiMiTS
(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf. Although Dr. Fagan notes
that insufficient evidence exists from which to assess the efficacy of domestic violence
treatment programs, id. at 18-20, he also observes that the complexities of domestic violence




formal law, it assumes that traditional punishment is the more appropriate
response.
Moreover, even if one accepts the depiction of diversion as a less serious
intervention than conviction and incarceration, just as with intrafamily child
sexual abuse cases, proving domestic violence cases beyond a reasonable doubt
can be difficult, making a systemic alternative to trial attractive. Diversion
programs, in particular, can enhance cooperation from victims who might
otherwise refuse to testify. Whether out of loyalty, guilt, financial dependence,
love, or some combination, many victims do not want their abusers to be
incarcerated or stigmatized by criminal convictions. They do, however, want
the violence to stop. The counseling and state supervision mandated by
diversion offers the potential for future change without a formal conviction.9
Just as plea bargaining considerations might shape the criminal justice
system's response to intrafamily crime, so can other forms of prosecutorial
discretion that shape the enforcement of formal law. For example, Privilege or
Punish is skeptical of both parental responsibility laws and the criminalization
of the failure to pay child support." In both instances, the authors indicate that
noncriminal sanctions would be more appropriate. 9
However, contemporary law enforcement can be nuanced, and prosecutors
and policymakers need not always choose between civil and criminal sanctions.
In both the parental responsibility and child support contexts, the real-world
implementation of statutory prohibitions can often soften seemingly draconian
formal law. As a prosecutor, I worked on both child support enforcement and
parental responsibility cases. In neither context were cases referred to us by
general police officers. Civil servants staffed the child support cases, filing wage
and tax refund garnishments, searching for unreported bank accounts, and
meeting with obligor parents to establish payment agreements. They
forwarded only the most willful failures of support to prosecutors to seek
incarceration, and family court judges, not criminal courts, heard the resulting
91. See Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in
the Trenches, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 28, 33 (noting the clash between the realities of
domestic violence prosecutions and "a strict application of our adversarial legal system,"
which may in domestic violence cases "exacerbate the problem and increase the danger to
victims").
92. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 112-18 (applying a normative framework to parental
responsibility laws); id. at 14o-44.
93. Id. at 114-15 (arguing that a negligence standard for parental liability would be more
appropriate than the imposition of strict liability); id. at 144 (recommending a restorative
justice process for failure to pay child support, "a solution that minimizes the use of the
criminal sanction to ensure these obligations are met").
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cases. 94 Similarly, parental responsibility prosecutions came to us not through
unsympathetic patrol officers but from school counselors and social workers
who worked with officers assigned to specialized units that focused on
juveniles. When working with families to identify the underlying cause of their
children's delinquency, the teams would only rarely invoke the possibility of
charges against the parents, and even then did so primarily to overcome
parental apathy.
My personal experiences applying criminal parental responsibility and child
support statutes were not unusual. Although today's parental responsibility
laws have early roots,95 they must be evaluated in the context of other juvenile
justice reforms. In the mid-nineties, arguably the height of the most recent
wave of juvenile crime prevention efforts, the Department of Justice concluded
that "[w]hile some states impose criminal liability on parents of delinquent
youth, many more have enacted less stringent types of parental responsibility
laws." 6 For example, states require parents to attend delinquency proceedings,
pay the costs of court proceedings or state detention or treatment of their
children, attend counseling with their children, or participate in parental
training courses.9 7 The possibility of criminal charges is often used as leverage
to persuade otherwise uncooperative parents to participate in such programs, 9s
perhaps explaining in part why law enforcement supports parental
responsibility laws even as it rarely enforces them formally.99
94. My office indicted a parent on criminal charges only once during my five years there.
Instead, we most often filed civil contempt proceedings. See supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text. In one case, a self-employed obligor who reported annual losses to the
Internal Revenue Service while mysteriously supporting his own seemingly comfortable
lifestyle told a judge that a contempt finding was acceptable to him because he could use
some time off and would bring a book to the jail cell. Within twenty-four hours I received a
phone call from a Sheriff s Deputy: a prisoner who had been removed from his cell for work
duty to line the rising Willamette River with sandbags wanted me to know he could write a
check for sixteen thousand dollars if I could get him out of the rain.
95. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 8o OR. L. REV. 1, 38-39
(2001).
96. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
INITIATIVES IN THE STATES 1994-1996, at 19 (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdfflles/reform.pdf.
97. Id. at 19-20.
98. See Seth Mydans, Mother is Charged Because a Son Is California Street Gang Suspect, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 4, 1989, at Ai8 (noting that a California parental responsibility law was
"intended to give the police leverage in pressing parents to meet some minimal standards of
supervision in a culture of poverty where family control has often broken down").
99. An empirical study of the enforcement of local parental responsibility laws in Oregon found




Criminal prosecutions for the failure to pay child support are similarly
infrequent. Although Privilege or Punish focuses on criminal statutes that
punish the failure to pay child support, ' states more commonly invoke a
court's contempt powers, and the use of civil contempt proceedings is far more
common than criminal contempt charges. 10 Civil contempt proceedings,
although culminating in incarceration, are intended to coerce, not punish. ' °2
Moreover, as with my experience in practice, most jurisdictions couple civil and
criminal remedies in child support cases within the same enforcement
offices,10 3 so that contempt proceedings and criminal prosecutions are used in
combination with other approaches, 0 4 including those that Privilege or Punish
advocates as alternatives, such as wage garnishment, tax refund interception,
and passport and state license suspension.' The authors concede that
"conviction and probation may well be valuable in inducing a repeat offender
to pay" and that even incarceration might be appropriate as "an option of last
resort.', °6 But to know whether prosecutors who enforce child support orders
Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending Messages, but What
Kind and to Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 5, 10, 22-23. Most parents were issued verbal
warnings, and citations were generally issued only after multiple contacts from police. Id. at
24.
1o. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 72.
ol. Lisa Kelly, If Anybody Asks You Who I Am: An Outsider's Story of the Duty To Establish
Paternity, 6 YALE J.L. &FEMINISM 297, 311 n.20 (1994).
102. Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt,
38 AM. U.L. REV. 491, 503 (1989); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent
Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor's Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95,
104 n.6o (2008).
103. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25- 5 o9(A) (2000) ("The attorney general or county attorney
may establish, modify or enforce such a duty of support by all means available, including all
civil and criminal remedies provided by law."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5245 (West 2004)
("Nothing in this chapter limits the authority of the local child support agency to use any
other civil and criminal remedies to enforce support obligations . .. ."); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 10-103 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that State's Attorney and local support
enforcement offices may "use any other civil or criminal remedy to enforce a child or spousal
support order"); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119A, § 2(a) (West 2008) (mandating an
agency to enforce child support orders "through civil and criminal proceedings"); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 74.20.220(7) (West 2001) (recognizing the authority of attorney general
and prosecuting attorneys "to use any and all civil and criminal remedies to enforce,
establish, or modify child support obligations").
104. See Patterson, supra note 102, at n8 ("The contempt process is used only with those
contemnors from whom support cannot be obtained through other enforcement techniques,
including wage withholding and seizure of assets.").
105. MARKELETAL., supra note 4, at 142.
1o6. Id. at 143.
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treat incarceration as a first or last resort requires a look beyond formal law to
discretionary charging decisions.
To point out, as I have, that cases involving intrafamily sexual and physical
violence might be charged, plea bargained, or sentenced differently than other
cases is not to advocate the efficacy or moral appropriateness of that reality.
Domestic violence scholars, for example, vigorously debate the merits of
offering offenders treatment in lieu of prosecution. 7 Diversion programs
might trouble retributivist theorists in particular because of the absence of
formal punishment."' Even utilitarians debate the efficacy of treatment in lieu
of punishment.! 9 Similarly, for purposes of this Feature, I do not offer a full-
throated defense of the use of rarely enforced criminal charges, such as parental
responsibility or criminal nonsupport statutes, as leverage to coerce state-
preferred behavior. Any significant consideration of that practice would require
a much broader discussion about the desirability of law enforcement discretion
generally."0  However, law enforcement's restriction of both parental
responsibility and failure to support statutes to only the most derelict parents,
even though discretionary and unformalized, at least arguably serves
107. Scholars have not reached a consensus on whether nontraditional sanctions are appropriate
in domestic violence cases. Compare Hanna, supra note 61, at 1542 ("In comparison to other
crimes, preferring treatment to incarceration for domestic violence looks like lingering
sexism."), with Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 608-09 (1999) ("In some cases, strategies such as
cultural or community support, shelter stays, or even diversion for the batterer make the
most sense.") (citation omitted). Privilege or Punish's assumption that treatment evinces
leniency toward domestic violence does not reflect this ongoing debate.
lo8. Michael C. Doff & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to
Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1507-o8 (2003) (noting the political and
moral tensions created when criminal courts offer treatment for domestic violence).
1o9. For example, advocates for battered women worry that nonpunitive sanctions can increase
the likelihood and severity of future assaults. Id. at 1507 n.26.
11o. There is considerable debate among academics regarding the amount of discretion that law
enforcement should enjoy, and under what circumstances. See generally David Cole,
Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1O63-64 (1999) (setting forth the risks of law enforcement
discretion); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 442-43
(2000) (discussing the inevitability of police discretion); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1169-70 (1998)
(suggesting that politically empowered communities might be better suited than courts to
evaluate the appropriate use of police discretion); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
551, 652 (1997) ("[In the community policing era, the accountability of police both to the
communities they serve and to the rule of law is best assured by recognizing explicitly the
inevitability-and even, properly managed, the desirability-of police discretion.").
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retributive purposes by increasing the likelihood that a punished parent's
conduct was voluntary."' From a utilitarian perspective, the discretionary
enforcement of these prohibitions arguably limits prosecution to those parents
whose future conduct can be affected and who have not responded to other
forms of incentive. Privilege or Punish's focus on formal law forecloses
exploration of the reasons that might justify these practices and, in doing so,
misses the opportunity to discuss how criminal offenses relating to families are
actually prosecuted.
CONCLUSION
Privilege or Punish exhaustively documents the ways that criminal law gives
effect to formal family status. It also identifies serious normative concerns that
are raised when criminal law's proscriptions rise and fall with familial ties, and
makes a compelling argument that we should consider family-based
distinctions in criminal law with caution."' My observations in this Feature are
intended to build on and amplify these important contributions to the growing
literature on criminal law and families. When criminal law's traditions are
distinguished from contemporary trends, and when formal law is analyzed not
in the abstract but through the lens of real world processes that shape its
application, Privilege or Punish's catalogue of family ties benefits and burdens
tells an evolutionary tale about the interactions between criminal law and the
definition of family: criminal law's treatment of families is not only moving,
but in a direction that the book's authors would presumably desire - away
from formal family-based distinctions.
Whereas criminal law traditionally valued family privacy over the
enforcement of its prohibitions within families, the contemporary criminal
justice system reaches within families with increasing regularity to enforce its
proscriptions. As familial privacy has become less sacrosanct, criminal law's
concern with the boundaries that serve to differentiate family relationships,
and thereby separate the private from the public, has also waned. At the same
Ill. See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 46 (1987)
("We can then formulate retributive theories of punishment as those theories which
maintain that punishment is justified because the offender has voluntarily committed a
morally wrong act.").
112. Privilege and Punish also adds another dimension to the current debate over gay marriage, as
we realize that a narrow definition of family excludes not only within tax, property,
inheritance, and other civil laws, but also on questions involving life and liberty. See Hills,
supra note 23, at 1427-28 (resisting Privilege or Punish's proposal to abolish family status from
criminal law and instead favoring reform of the categories that define family).
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time that criminal law has learned to reach within families, it has also learned
to respond to them. Because of unique enforcement challenges presented by
the application of formal law to families, the criminal justice system sometimes
yields to familial considerations -not eagerly, but with reluctance, and not to
promote or enforce preferred family forms, but to serve criminal law's
traditional purposes of retribution and deterrence.
While some would say that no discussion of criminal law and families is
complete without a thorough consideration of the criminal justice system's
changing response to domestic violence,11 Privilege or Punish discusses the
topic only briefly and in conclusion, in part because police and prosecutorial
leniency toward domestic violence is often informal, and "the law 'on the
streets' falls a bit outside the purview of [their] book. 114 Indeed, it is precisely
because police and prosecutors enforce criminal law against domestic violence
without regard to formal family status that the criminal law's response to
domestic violence largely falls beyond the scope of the book."' But domestic
violence enforcement is one of the most common contexts where contemporary
criminal law intersects with family considerations, and thirty years of
significant domestic violence reform demonstrates that the criminal law is
learning how to apply itself within families and to react to family
considerations. Moreover, criminal law often reaches into families without
relying on formal family status to do so. Most domestic violence laws are
defined not exclusively by a marriage between offender and victim, but by the
intimate relationship between them-whether married or not, gay or straight,
polyamorous or monogamous."'
Privilege or Punish compellingly documents and critiques the ways that
criminal law formally privileges and punishes actors based on family status.
When refrained to account for changes in the criminal law's treatment of
families over time, and the procedural realities that can shape practical
application of formal law, the authors' observations also tell a broader story
about the collisions between criminal law and families.
113. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
114. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 152. The authors also shy away from a lengthier discussion of
domestic violence because states "take wildly inconsistent positions." Id. at 151.
nS. Privilege or Punish discusses only briefly the "special and pronounced problem of domestic
violence." Id.
116. See Burke, supra note 61, at 559-63 (providing an overview of states' domestic violence
statutes); Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex
Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 193 (2005) ("Generally speaking, unmarried partners are
included in criminal domestic violence statutes .... .").
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